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This research uses differential association, techniques of neutralisation and rational 
choice theory to study those who operate ‘booter services’: websites that illegally 
offer denial-of-service attacks for a fee. Booter services provide ‘easy money’ for the 
young males that run them. The operators claim they provide legitimate services for 
network testing, despite acknowledging that their services are used to attack other 
targets. Booter services are advertised through the online communities where the 
skills are learnt and definitions favourable towards offending are shared. Some 
financial services proactively frustrate the provision of booter services, by closing the 
accounts used for receiving payments. 
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Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks involve overloading a website or 
computer system with so much bogus traffic that legitimate access is unlikely to 
succeed. The websites selling DDoS attacks for a fee are termed ‘booter’ or ‘stresser’ 
services. Booter comes from the malicious act of ‘booting’ a games player out of an 
online game, but the ‘stresser’ nomenclature has a benign meaning in that it refers to 
stress tests performed against one’s own servers to assess their resilience. We use 
‘booter’ in this paper to reflect the reality of the way in which these services are used. 
Booter services: An overview 
Booter services have been previously studied by Karami and McCoy (2013a; 2013b), 
and they give a detailed technical account of the technical methods used to send large 
amounts of bogus traffic to overwhelm the DDoS victim. The services we study in 
this paper were mainly using amplification techniques – small request packets are sent 
to a third-party computer, which returns (reflects) a much larger response, often 10 to 
20 times the size. However, the source of the requests is forged so that the responses 
go to the victim. By using many reflectors in parallel the booter service can 
overwhelm many victims simultaneously using just a single server to generate the 
request packets. 
 The booter services we studied offered their customers a range of membership 
options, from basic to premium subscriptions with the higher levels allowing users to 
request longer attacks and attacks on more than just one target at a time. Payment by 
PayPal is generally possible; however alternative payment options are usually 
available, including digital currencies such as Bitcoin. Entry level pricing allowing 10 
minute attacks on one target at a time was typically priced at less than US$ 5.00 a 
month. 
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 DDoS attacks have been used in extortion, with an attack that prevents a 
business from operating being followed by a demand for payment to make the attack 
cease. Extortion has worked best during crucial times for businesses, such as before 
big sporting events for betting websites (Menn 2010). Some businesses anticipate 
such attacks and purchase DDoS protection services from companies such as 
CloudFlare (CloudFlare 2014). DDoS attacks against government websites have been 
used as a method of protest, such as attacks against the website of the Australian 
Federal Parliament by Anonymous under the codename ‘Operation Titstorm’ in 
response to plans to filter online material (Hardy 2010). 
 However, as Karami and McCoy (2013b) make clear, an important aspect of 
DDoS attacks is their use by online gaming competitors who cheat by preventing 
good opponents from participating, by disrupting the opposing teams’ 
communications (TeamSpeak) servers or by disrupting the game servers themselves. 
They analysed a leaked database from one of the booter services which documented 
48,000 attacks against 11,000 victims over a 52 day period. The service received an 
income equivalent to US$ 7,727 per month. They concluded that the majority of the 
users were gamers, who used short-lived attacks of up to 10 minutes. Similarly, the 
majority of victims were game servers and forums, although other booters, 
government websites, and journalists had been targeted. Relevant though this 
information is, it is for just one booter service (and one that allowed their database to 
be compromised) so it is problematic to scale it up. To estimate the overall size of the 
booter market, Santanna and Sperotto (2014) identified 59 booters operational from 
October 2013 to mid-2014. Of these, 34 percent were reachable at all times, while the 
remaining 25 were, at times, offline.  
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The crime 
DDoS attacks are criminal in many jurisdictions and the legislation addresses both 
those providing services for hire and those that use the services. In the United States, 
s1030(a)(5) of the U.S. Code Title 18 creates an offence for knowingly causing the 
transmission of a program, information, code or command that causes damage 
without authorisation to a protected computer. Similarly, s3 of the Computer Misuse 
Act 1990 in the UK and s477.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Commonwealth) in 
Australia criminalise ‘unauthorised acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as 
to impairing, operation of computer’ and ‘unauthorised impairment of electronic 
communication’ respectively. Both the UK and Australian legislation provides 
penalties of up to 10 years imprisonment. The maximum available US punishment 
scales up with the type of harm caused, from 10 years and/or a fine, up to life 
imprisonment if the conduct results in death.  
Arrests and convictions for DDoS attacks date back many years, with the 
‘Mafia Boy’ attacks on Amazon, eBay etc. being one of the earliest cases to make 
headlines in 2001 (Verton 2002). The first known arrest relating to booter services 
was in 2010, in the United Kingdom (BBC News 2010). A 17 year old male was 
arrested after a DDoS attack against an online game using a booter service. It appears 
that he was a user, rather than the operator, of the booter service. The outcome of the 
case is unknown.  
In Australia in 2014, a 21 year old male was charged by police after he 
allegedly accessed the servers of an online game without authorisation (Chamberlin 
and Donaghey 2014). Along with usernames, email addresses, salted password hashes 
and transaction records, it was alleged that he obtained, and then sold, IP addresses of 
the users, that could be used on booter services to gain an advantage against 
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adversaries. It is alleged that he had received 880 payments for the data. Again, the 
outcome of this case is not known, although enquiries have been made. 
Our contribution 
What is missing from the research by Karami and McCoy (2013a; 2013b), and 
proposed by Santanna and Sperotto (2014), is the backstory of those that provide 
these services. As noted by Holt and Bossler (2014), there has been little research into 
the offenders who commit complex forms of cybercrime. We use criminology theory 
to explore how and why offenders begin providing booter services.  
In order to understand more about the provision of booter services, we asked 
those providing the services to tell us about themselves and their activities. This has 
been a successful way of understanding offline crimes such as burglary (Bennett and 
Wright 1984; Wright and Decker 1994). We used both online and interactive surveys 
and our experimental design informs future research into online offender populations 
by demonstrating how well each method performed. Our research is also unusual 
because it includes the entire known, albeit small, population of offenders. Booter 
services are provided through publicly accessible websites, and are advertised on 
forums where their potential customers are active. We invited the operators of every 
one of these websites to take part, and thus it is the first research into active 
cybercrime offenders for which a response rate can be determined.  
Criminological theories 
We use a number of criminological theories to inform our research into the provision 
of booter services. We use multiple theories as each provides unique and 
complementary insights into the nature of online crime. These include learning and 
the influence of others (Sutherland’s (1949) theory of differential association), how 
offenders perceive the wrongfulness of their actions (Sykes and Matza’s (1957) 
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techniques of neutralisation), and the drive for gain with (dis)regard for the 
consequences (Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) rational choice theory).  
Differential association 
The key point from Sutherland’s theory of differential association is that criminal 
behaviour is normal behaviour learnt in interaction with others (Vold et al. 2002). The 
theory consists of nine specific points. Summarised, these points are that criminal 
behaviour is learnt in interaction with other persons in intimate personal groups. What 
is learnt includes both the techniques of committing crime, and “motives, drives, 
rationalisations and attitudes” (Sutherland et al. 1992:89) either favourable or 
unfavourable to committing crime. Crime is committed when those definitions 
favourable to committing crime exceeds those unfavourable to crime (Sutherland et 
al. 1992).  
There are two basic elements of differential association. The first is the 
cognitive element, or the content of what is learnt, such as “specific techniques for 
committing crimes; appropriate motives, drives, rationalisations, and attitudes; and 
more general definitions favourable to law violation” (Vold et al. 2002:160). 
Sutherland did not specify the learning mechanisms, simply stating that “the process 
of learning criminal behaviour … involves all of the mechanisms that are involved in 
any other learning” (Sutherland et al. 1992:90). The second element of differential 
association is the associations with other people in intimate personal groups where the 
learning takes place (Vold et al. 2002).  
In explaining why different people exposed to the same social conditions may 
or may not conduct criminal behaviour, Sutherland claimed that it is the meanings 
that they give to these conditions that they experience that determines whether they 
violate the law. These meanings vary with the “frequency, duration, priority and 
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intensity” (Sutherland et al. 1992:89) of the associations with criminal groups. 
Sutherland supported this argument with qualitative research techniques (Vold et al. 
2002).  
Research indicates that high tech cybercrime offenders learn from each other 
and share information between themselves (Holt 2007; Hutchings 2014; Jordan and 
Taylor 1998; Levin et al. 2012). There are many well-developed online communities 
which are used for learning and sharing information and ideologies, recruiting others 
to commit offences, and trading tools (Holt 2007; Hutchings and Holt 2015; Levin et 
al. 2012). The online social communities where differential association and learning 
takes place tend to be male-dominated and less accepting of those that identify as 
female (Hutchings 2013a). These communities are based on a subculture of gaming 
and online interaction that relates to the young age of the participants (Hutchings 
2014). 
Hollinger (1993), while not organising his study of software piracy and 
unauthorised computer account access around a theoretical perspective, included 
variables measuring participants’ friends’ involvement in these types of crime, as well 
as self-reported involvement. Hollinger (1993) found that as the number of friends 
who were involved in unauthorised access to computer accounts increase, so did the 
likelihood that the participant would report partaking in this activity. Similarly, Holt 
et al. (2012) found that deviant peer associations within a student population were 
related to self-reported cybercrime.  
Techniques of neutralisation 
Sykes and Matza’s (1957) theory, techniques of neutralisation, is that offenders learn 
to use techniques to justify or neutralise acts that might otherwise produce feelings of 
shame or guilt, and distinguish between “appropriate and inappropriate targets for… 
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deviance” (Sykes and Matza 1957:666). These techniques include to deny 
responsibility, to deny injury, to deny the victim, to condemn the condemners, and to 
appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes and Matza 1957).  
Sykes and Matza (1957) argued that techniques of neutralisations were an 
extension of legal defences to crime, such as provocation or self-defence, which were 
seen as legitimate by those utilising them but not by the justice system. An interesting 
defence that has been raised by some defendants accused of computer-related crime, 
sometimes successfully, is that of addiction to computers, which they argued 
compelled them to act in the way that they did (Smith et al. 2004). Such an excuse 
would relate to the technique denial of responsibility posed by Sykes and Matza 
(1957).  
McQuade (2006:160) states that techniques of neutralisation is a sound 
explanation for computer crime as the physical removal from the victim allows the 
offender to deny injury or deny the victim with ease:  
Since they cannot see the Internet or the people who create content, victims, if 
they are contemplated at all, become faceless entities, computer systems, or 
perhaps corporations rather than real people whose livelihoods and wellbeing 
are compromised… 
Yar (2005) also states that hackers’ self-purported motivations for offending may be 
forms of neutralisations aimed at overcoming guilt. Yar (2005:391) describes these 
motivations as: 
Intellectual curiosity, the desire for expanding the boundaries of knowledge, a 
commitment to the free flow and exchange of information, resistance to 
political authoritarianism and corporate domination, and the aim of 
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improving computer security by exposing the laxity and ineptitude of those 
charged with safeguarding socially sensitive data. 
Additional neutralisations proposed by Grabosky (2005) include blaming the victim 
as being deserving of attack, claiming that no harm was done by simply accessing 
data, that corporate victims could afford losses, or claiming that everyone else did it.  
A study by Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2009) into the use of techniques of 
neutralisation by offenders engaged in hacking, software piracy and phone phreaking 
found evidence that these offenders: deny injury by claiming that “downloading 
information is copying rather than stealing”; deny the victim by justifying their 
actions as revenge or targeting sites owned by the ‘enemy’, such as Nazis and 
Microsoft; condemn the condemners, such as those who prevent access to the 
information that they are seeking; and appeal to higher loyalties, especially the hacker 
ethic of freedom of information. However, Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2009) found no 
evidence that these offenders engaged in denial of responsibility.  
In comparison, Walkley (2005) analysed techniques of neutralisation to 
determine its explanatory power in relation hacking and internet fraud, concluding 
that there was strong support for denial of responsibility and mixed support for the 
other techniques of neutralisation. Using open source data Walkley (2005) claimed 
that, when internet addiction, as a mental health problem, has been used as a defence 
in court, the defendants were neutralising their actions by denying responsibility. 
Walkley (2005) also stated that two defendants, who claimed that their computer had 
been infected with a virus or trojan which had caused the damage they were charged 
with, were also engaging in denial of responsibility, despite the fact that in both 
instances the defendants had been acquitted and therefore were found not to have 
been responsible at all.  
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The techniques of neutralisation that Hutchings (2013b) found in use by 
cybercrime offenders include denial of injury (as there is no loss to individual 
victims) and denial of the victim (as they do not secure their systems, are undertaking 
questionable activities, or are perceived to have done them wrong). Offenders 
sometimes avoid targets when they are seen as undeserving of victimisation or there is 
the potential for innocent parties to be harmed. Use of condemnation of the 
condemners as a technique of neutralisation is evidenced where it is accused that the 
victim has caused harm to others, for example if a military site is being attacked. 
Offenders also appeal to higher loyalties when their actions are believed to be for the 
common good, such as increasing transparency or revealing vulnerabilities. However 
in support of Turgeman-Goldschmidt’s (2009) findings, Hutchings (2013b) found 
little evidence for the use of denial of responsibility. For example, active offenders 
advised that they consider themselves to be addicted to computers, however they do 
not perceive this as warranting a legal defence.  
Rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory assumes that offenders calculate the perceived costs and 
benefits of crime with the assumption that they seek some type of advantage from 
their actions, be it “money, sex or excitement” (Cornish and Clarke 1987:935). Clarke 
and Cornish’s rational choice theory looks at how offenders in particular situations 
make these calculations (Vold et al. 2002). The theory acknowledges that offenders’ 
perceptions of costs and benefits can be subjective, “…constrained as they are by 
time, the offender’s cognitive abilities, and the availability of relevant information…” 
(Cornish and Clarke 1987:933), and therefore may not be rational at all (Akers and 
Sellers 2004).  
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Other “choice-structuring properties” (Cornish and Clarke 1987:935) are 
offence specific. To demonstrate, when offenders weigh up the type and amount of 
benefit likely against the perceived risk of detection and punishment, they take into 
consideration their skills and the skills needed to successfully commit the offence, and 
the availability of necessary equipment or situations (Cornish and Clarke 1987). In 
addition, each of these considerations may not have equal weight. For example, a high 
likelihood of detection may be more influential in deterring crime than harsh 
punishments (Clarke 1997). 
Research into cybercrime has found that offenders generally perceive the 
likelihood of being detected as low, and this holds greater weight than the harshness 
of available punishments (Hollinger 1993; Hutchings 2013a; McQuade 2006; Skinner 
and Fream 1997). Benefits obtained from general offence types are mainly financial, 
while those engaged in more technically challenging types of offending enjoy a 
greater range of benefits. These include skill development, fun and excitement, social 
status, power and sexual gratification (Hutchings 2013b). Hutchings (2013a) found 
that offenders desist from cybercrime when they no longer receive benefits from 
offending, or when costs outweigh benefits. For example, some offenders stop when 
they no longer experience excitement or obtain a sense of achievement from their 
activities. The costs to offenders are not limited to the punishments metered out by the 
criminal justice system. As offenders believe that the likelihood of detection is low, 
costs associated with offending are mainly social in nature, including the amount of 
time they spend online, which interferes with legitimate employment or intimate 
relationships. Costs also include feelings of guilt or shame, which may previously 
have been mediated by being online, as offenders are not in physical contact with 
victims.  
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Our survey of booter operators 
We employed a mixed method, cross-sectional design, examining the provision of 
booter services within the population at one point in time. Data were collected from 
July to September 2014. 
 We started by compiling a list of booter services. These services are openly 
advertised – the operators do not find it necessary to hide in the ‘dark web’ but seek to 
be as easy to locate as possible. We ran searches for relevant keywords (booter, 
stresser and DDoS), identified existing lists of booter services, and visited several 
online criminal forums where booters are advertised to determine which services were 
being promoted (or indeed mentioned in comments as being superior to the new 
service). This gave us an initial list of 45 operational booter services, but we repeated 
this phase a few weeks later and eventually identified 63 distinct websites, albeit it 
became clear some of the operators were running more than one website so there were 
perhaps just 40 to 50 individuals involved in the business. 
 We set up a pseudonymous account on every website, but we found that in 
only a handful of cases could we determine contact details for the owner either from 
the website contents, the domain registration records or the PayPal address offered for 
payments. Fortunately, almost all of the websites had online contact forms that 
provided a way for customers to report technical issues or discuss billing problems, 
and we mainly used these contact forms as a way of reaching the website operators. 
Recruitment  
We wanted to understand how to get the highest possible level of response to this type 
of survey so we randomly assigned our population into two groups. One group (n=32) 
was sent an explanatory message along with a link to an online (Survey Monkey) 
survey, while the other group (n=31) was sent the same explanation of our aims, but 
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was invited to participate in a real time, online, interactive interview. Participants 
were provided with a unique URL for the online survey to allow us to know if the link 
was shared with anyone else. 
The original intention was to collect data for a period of four weeks. Each 
group was to receive an invitation for the method that they had been assigned (online 
survey or interview), and after two weeks they would also be offered the alternative 
way to participate, in order to maximise the response rate, with a total of four 
invitations to participate. In practice, data collection continued for longer than 
intended. This was due to the varied availability of the sites. On average, 2.5 
invitations were sent for each website, with a maximum of four invitations. Of the 
population of 63 that were invited to participate, 7 declined to do so, 25 did not reply 
to the invitations, 7 did not receive all four invitations as their websites went offline 
during the data collection period, and 12 sites did not receive any invitations as their 
websites were either offline, or they did not have means available to contact them.  
 In total, 13 responses were received with 7 from the online survey group. 
However, 2 of these used the same unique URL, apparently because they ran the site 
together. Of the 6 responses from the interactive interview group, 4 opted for the later 
online survey option. In the end 2 participants opted for the interactive survey, while 
the remaining 11 completed the online survey. This is an overall response rate of 25% 
from the population size of 51 who received at least one invitation to participate. 
The survey of booter service providers 
Our main aim was to understand the motivations of the people operating these 
websites, their perceptions of the (il)legality, the market for their services and the 
economic benefits they might receive. We also wanted to understand the time 
commitment, how they became involved in the business, whether they work with 
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other people, along with practical details about how the customer-facing websites and 
backend services were set up.  
 The survey used for this research was constructed using a mix of closed and 
open-ended questions, in order to encourage a broad range of responses. The survey 
included 32 items, and participants could opt not to answer any of the questions that 
were asked. Throughout the survey, the services were referred to as ‘stresser 
services’. It is not believed that this choice of terminology affected participants’ 
responses, as they readily acknowledged that their services were used for online 
attacks, and the term ‘booter’ was used repeatedly in participants’ open-ended 
responses. 
 The data were analysed using quantitative and qualitative analysis procedures. 
The content from the qualitative analysis in the results section are provided verbatim. 
As the population size is relatively small, the quantitative analysis conducted is 
primarily descriptive. 
Results 
Participant characteristics  
Three participants did not answer any questions relating to their characteristics. The 
remaining ten participants were rather homogeneous with regards to age and gender. 
Eight participants were male, and two selected the ‘other’ category (with the supplied 
responses being ‘alien’ and ‘Trigender Pyrofox’, a reference to a Cyanide and 
Happiness webcomic). Nine participants were in the 16 to 24 age group, while the 
other was aged 25 to 34. Seven participants responded to the question asking what 
date they started providing these services. These responses were used to calculate the 
number of years that they had been operating for, which ranged from 0.67 to 3.01 
years (n = 7, M = 1.64, SD = 0.75). Five participants advised that they lived in North 
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America, two were in Europe, while the remaining participants lived in Asia, Africa, 
and Australia. Eight participants were students, while two were working at some other 
place of employment.  
Participants were asked how they rated their computer and technical 
proficiency. Only one participant believed that they were ‘below proficient’, with the 
reason for this self-rating being “still a kid got a lot more to learn”. Another two 
selected ‘proficient’. One explained that although he could know a lot more than he 
currently did, he knew a lot more than the average person. The other stated that he 
could get done whatever he wanted to get done, if he could get himself to spend the 
time on it. Seven participants self-rated themselves as ‘advanced’. When supplying 
reasons for this rating, three participants referred to knowledge of web development, 
computer networks, operating systems, and programming languages. One participant 
referred to future aspirations: 
Because in the future I don't plan on having a job so shitty that I need to resort 
to reviewing fucking booters. 
For some, the pathway to offending was gradual, with an escalation in offending. 
Some first began by using booter services, before offering these services themselves. 
One participant described how he started offering these services to clients of his web 
hosting company, and later made them publicly available. The following participant 
was a user of these services, began providing a small service himself, and now offers 
multiple services to others: 
First, I use to host Game servers. After using stresser stuff for my servers, I 
did a deep research on it and decided to open my own stresser to provide 
stress testing service to other. After seeing profit in it, I decided to open two 
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more stresser to expand. Currently, I'm running three stresser and a hosting 
company. 
Nine participants responded to the question about whether they provide these services 
on other websites. Six participants provided these services on the one site only, while 
three provided services on one or more additional sites. One of these participants 
advised that: 
I manage the back end system such as dedicated servers and ensuring the 
service operates for multiple other stresser services that I'm sure they'd like to 
remain unnamed, but yes. [Interviewer asked a question about how many 
sites]: 5, which includes the one you're current interviewing me about. 
Seven participants advised that they provided other online services, in addition to 
stresser services. One specified that they did not provide any additional services, and 
five did not answer this question. Combinations of legitimate and illegal, or 
potentially illegal, services were listed. On the more lawful side, there were coding 
services, pentesting services, hosting virtual private servers, web development, 
webhosting, resolvers, and Minecraft server hosting. Participants also advised that 
they provided ‘Stressing API’ services, setup stressing servers, phone number geo 
locators and PayPal limitation services (it is presumed that this refers to restoring 
limited PayPal accounts). One participant stated: 
I would rather not divulge the names of other companies I am involved in, 
however, I can say that I am involved in providing DDoS protection services, 
high availability web hosting, dedicated server hosting, and virtural server 
hosting.  
Later, the same participant sent the following advertisement over Skype to the 
account we used for our interview (and doubtless to others as well): 
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Offering FaceBook Hacking [Service] minimal for a job is $30. 
Differential association 
Two main themes arose from the question as to how participants became involved in 
providing booter services. These included the influence of others, and exposure to 
these services through gaming and online communities. In relation to the influence of 
others, participants were either told about the potential to make money from the 
provision of these services by a friend, or knew somebody who was already in the 
business: 
my friend told me that making stressers for companies that need to stress test 
their servers was very profitable so that is why i got involved. 
The original founder of the service I'm involved with was a close friend of 
mine, and about 3 years ago he started the service (he is no longer involved, 
he left in early 2012), and at the time I was beginning my interest in web 
development and at that time, most of the services offered same functionality 
and design and I helped him create an eye-catching product. 
Participants also reported using the services before being provided with an 
opportunity to become involved: 
I became involved by looking at the stresser dashboard the owner was offering 
to positions and i felt like i would be a great moderator. 
and becoming exposed through online gaming forums: 
I used to be on a minecraft forum and I was trying to make money. 
Two participants referred to learning new skills to be able to provide booter services, 
for example: 
To gain extra knowledge on the subject for my networking class, as well as 
providing a service for people who would like to pentest there own network. 
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Techniques of neutralisation 
The one question that every respondent answered was “What are your primary 
motivations for offering stresser services?” Here, the majority of participants provided 
responses that attempted to neutralise or excuse their behaviour, perhaps reflecting 
their reasons for participating in the research. The primary motivation, as claimed by 
eight participants, was the provision of services for the purpose of network testing. 
Here, participants appealed to higher loyalties, by claiming that they provided 
services that were for the common good, namely that their actions provided more 
secure systems overall: 
Our primary Motive is to provide service to those who want to check there 
network security and we have many clients who bought this service to have a 
good and secure network ! 
Definitions favourable to offending, and uses of techniques of neutralisation were 
explored when asking about perceptions of legality. First, participants were asked if 
they thought provision of their services should be against the law, and whether it was 
against the law in their location. Only one participant believed that providing these 
services should be against the law. When asked about whether stress tests against 
specific targets, namely game servers, TeamSpeak (intra-team communication) 
servers, and against individual Internet users or organisations, should be against the 
law, only two participants believed that stress tests against all three targets should be 
illegal, while some other participants believed that it should be legal to conduct stress 
targets against some targets, but not others. Responses are shown in Table 1. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
Five participants believed that providing these services was not against the law 
in their location. When asked about whether the use of these services against different 
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targets two respondents believed that all three examples provided were illegal in their 
jurisdiction.  
[insert Table 2 here] 
Eight participants answered the question about how appropriate it was to 
provide these services to anyone who wished to buy them, on a scale from totally 
inappropriate to totally appropriate. One participant answered that it was totally 
inappropriate (a score of one), five answered totally appropriate (score of 10), and the 
average score was 7.75 (SD = 3.66). When asked about how appropriate providing 
stresser tests for use against the various targets were, participants on average viewed 
these as being less appropriate when compared to the provision of stresser services in 
general. While one participant believed that it was ‘absolutely appropriate’ to provide 
these services for use against all three targets, another three participants believed that 
it was ‘absolutely inappropriate’ to do so. These results are shown in Table 3. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
Nine participants advised how they came to their views about the legality and 
appropriateness of providing these services in general. Three participants spoke about 
how there was a legitimate need for stress testing, and as such it should not be illegal 
to provide these services, for example: 
If you'd like further explanation, because it can assist a lot of data centers, 
server owners small and large prepare for an actual threatening attack that 
can cripple their networks for long periods of time resulting in financial loss,  
if they are prepared before an actual attack strikes, less damage will be done. 
One participant denied responsibility for how the services offered were used. It was 
claimed that it was how the services were applied that should determine the legality, 
however it should be the end user that is responsible: 
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Because, there are people who legitimately need to test the stress of there 
servers, its just the way that you use these tools that make them malicious or 
illegal. 
Another participant denied injury, advised that he was acting within the bounds of the 
law as he would provide logs to law enforcement upon request: 
My stresser keeps logs like almost every other stresser. If someone breaks the 
law and the police come to me I have the logs for them, nothing to hide. I've 
seen this happen to other booter owners I know. 
One participant used the technique of condemning the condemners, saying that in 
comparison to other online content, it was not so bad: 
Freedom of the human rights and before you ban stressers ban pornography 
and other disgusting forms of videos 
One participant had a range of arguments about his perceptions of the legalities of 
providing these services, which largely denied responsibility. His arguments were that 
only large corporations cared about it, that hosting companies should start taking 
responsibility and protect their clients against attacks, that the responsibility falls 
upon the user of the service, not the provider, and that the site’s terms and conditions 
protect the provider (this last point was also made by another participant): 
No... it happens so much every day that only large corporations ever even 
make claims against those commiting these acts (mostly due to having excess 
money they can just throw around).  I strongly believe that this issue is not 
going away anytime soon.  Personally, I would produce more than 5 Gbps of 
bandwidth from my home connection, now sure, I actually know what I'm 
doing, but this just goes to show it is a serious problem.  Hosting companies 
need to start taking responsibility for their otherwise unknowning clients and 
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help protect them from these threats. This is techically incorrect... the way the 
law is writen, the responsibility fall on the end user.  Yes, it is close, but our 
Terms and Conditions have been reviewed by our attorney to be legally sound. 
When asked if they had any other remarks about how proper, wrong or illegal the 
provision of these services are, or should be, seven participants provided their views. 
One respondent stated that all attacks on a network that are not owned by the attacker 
should be illegal, and therefore it didn’t matter what the server was used for: 
All Attacks to a outbound network that is not owned by you should be illegal 
so splitting up what networks can and cant be stressed thats dumb. 
Another participant agreed that it was wrong to use stresser services against the 
examples provided, namely game servers, TeamSpeak servers and individual Internet 
users or organisations. He advised that he had been receiving abuse reports, and was 
now advising users that they should not be testing networks without permission: 
I think it's wrong and at the beginning of this project when my friend and I ran 
it, we frankly did not have any indiciation we didn't permit this but as time 
progressed, I've written in places that it should only be used in a testing 
environment where you're test loading your network and preparing for an 
actual attack, ensuring you have explicit permission from device and facility 
owners. We've handled a lot of reports within the past 6 months regarding this 
and we do our best to handle the abuse. 
Another participant claimed that it was not up to the provider of the service to 
determine whether the users are acting illegally: 
I'm saying I don't know on the last three against the law because there are 
obviously certain servers that they could illegally test and certain servers that 
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they could test legally. It's not for me to decide whether they are attacking 
something illegally, there isn't a way I can. 
Rational choice theory 
Financial gain was reported as a reason for operating booter sites by six participants. 
Two participants referred to earning between US$300 to US$500, and US$200 to 
US$300, per day. Another described it as ‘easy money’: 
Mainly financial purposes, its easy money. When I first started doing stresser 
services though it was just for the kick of making a good stresser and all 
profits from the stresser would go back into more attack servers, at this point 
though I don't care about that and just want easy money. 
Financial gain was not the only benefit of providing booter services, with another 
participant advising that he also benefited from feelings of excitement: 
Well lets be real, My primary motivations is money. We offer these services to 
people who are willing to pay large sums of money to keep targets offline and 
kids who want to feel like they are hackers. We do try market these services 
towards a more legitimate user base but we know where the money comes 
from. For a network nerd such as myself seeing what stressers can do to 
networks in real time is a very exciting and fun thing to do and I actually get 
excited when I find out that someone is using the service for that rather than to 
be a thorn in the side of the internet. 
Ten participants answered what percentage of their income is provided by their 
services, in an average month. The responses were fairly evenly distributed. Three 
participants reported that zero to 10 percent of their income is provided by these 
services, while two participants received between 91 to 100 percent of their income 
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this way. The remaining respondents reported 21 to 30 percent (n = 1), 31 to 40 
percent (n = 1), 61 to 70 percent (n = 2) and 81 to 90 percent (n = 1).  
 Participants were asked, in an average month, how many ‘stress tests’ (i.e. 
DDoS attacks) were performed, the number of cumulative seconds tests are 
performed for, and the number of individual accounts that request tests. There was a 
large amount of variability, particularly as one participant reported very few tests, 
which was consistent with other responses this participant had provided. Responses to 
these questions for this participant were therefore removed, and the subsequent results 
are provided in Table 4. Here, the number of cumulative seconds tests are performed 
for has been recalculated as hours. Also included in Table 4 are calculations for the 
number of tests per account, and the number of seconds per test.  
[insert Table 4 here] 
The cost per subscription for up to one month was calculated for all 63 sites. 
The currency used was US dollars, as this was listed by the majority of the sites, and 
the conversion rate as of 24 September 2014 was used for the sites that used 
alternative currencies. One outlier was removed from the data, as it was 5.3 standard 
deviations above the mean. The cost was positively skewed, ranging from 0.19¢ to 
$14.99 per subscription, with a median cost of $4.00 per subscription (n = 62, M = 
4.57, SD = 3.40, 95% CI [3.71, 5.43]).  
Income per month was estimated by using the 95% confidence intervals for 
the cost of subscriptions for the sites ($3.71 to $5.43 per account), multiplied by the 
number of accounts per month reported by the participants. One outlier was identified 
and removed, as it was 2.3 standard deviations above the mean. The median values 
for the remaining six participants who reported the number of individual accounts that 
requested stress tests were used. With the outlier removed, the median number of 
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accounts per month was 1,000 (n = 6, M = 1,047.2, SD = 686.2). It is estimated that, 
in an average month, the sites earned between $3,705.25 and $5,430.67. This is a 
conservative estimate, using the lowest tier of pricing offered by the booter sites.  
In relation to costs, participants were asked how many hours they spent 
maintaining the website in an average month. Ten participants responded to this 
question, with responses ranging from one to 400 hours per month (M = 112.30, SD = 
130.51). The most disruption reported by participants in the operation of their services 
was in relation to payment methods, with seven participants advising that these had 
changed over time. Of these, six had trouble accepting payments through PayPal, the 
preferred payment method. For example: 
Paypal is always closing us down for running stressers, it's really a problem 
as that is our main way to get paid. 
One participant advised that he changed his PayPal email every week in order to 
continue to receive payments: 
Change paypal email every week, tried other processors, did not work at all. 
Another participant advised that his payment methods had changed when Liberty 
Reserve had been shut down, and that he had recently begun accepting credit cards 
and digital currencies: 
We've been accepting PayPal since the beginning, we used to accept Liberty 
Reserve which was a popular payment processor until it was shutdown, and 
most recently we've began accepting a lot of crypto currency payments 
(Bitcoin, Litecoin) and as well as credit card payments. 
About the customer-facing site 
Participants were asked what methods were used for the stress tests. Ten participants 
responded to this question, reporting between three and 11 methods in use (M = 5.60, 
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SD = 2.32). The most commonly used methods included DNS reflection (n = 8), SYN 
flood (n = 6), HTTP GET/HEAD/POST flood (n = 7), R.U.D.Y (slow HTTP form 
submission) (n = 7), and Slowloris (slow HTTP interaction) (n = 8). When asked 
about why their methods had changed over time, the main themes related to 
efficiency, displacement, popularity, and ease of use. Two participants referred to 
efficiency, including the power of different methods, and use of resources compared 
to damage caused. For example: 
Chargen is the most efficient amplification method, dns reflection hits about 
the same as chargen but it uses up the servers whole port (we use 100mbit 
servers) chargen will hit the same while only sending about 1/6 of the servers 
capacity. when also have udp syn ssyn essyn hulk rudy arme slowloris get 
head post (we use chargen for udp because it's much more efficient), I have 
taken out all layer 7 attacks because they use so many resources and no-one 
really uses them. 
Four participants also described how they displaced from one method to another. 
Displacement occurred when reflection servers were updated and patched. The 
following example also refers to the use of CloudFlare as a reason for changing 
methods: 
The methods have been changed as increase in protection. At first, we use L7 
methoods for website but after apache updates and cloudflare service, we 
moved on to DNS/NTP reflection, 
Two participants referred to the popularity of the methods being taken up, with one 
saying that some methods had been requested by users. The other stated that: 
Since the start, there's been many different amplification/reflection such as 
earlier this year when using NTP servers as an amplification method became 
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extremely popular. As of right now we do offer the most recent methods of 
DDoS (except SNMP amplification) for the service. 
Finally, one participant included ease of use as a reason for using a particular method: 
they have become more advanced, powerful, able to cause more damage, and 
easier to use and implement. 
The participants were asked how their customer-facing site was set up, for example, if 
they used existing source code, or wrote their own code with or without the assistance 
of others. Eight participants responded to this question, with three advising that they 
had written the code by themselves. Another advised that he had written the code by 
himself, but had previously used code by an unknown author. One participant advised 
that while he coded the website on his own, he used ragebooter source code (which 
was stolen in 2012 and made publicly available) as an example: 
I'm a PHP Developer so I have coded it on my own. I did use rage booter 
source code as a sample to see how things work out. 
Two participants had written the code in collaboration with someone else. One had 
previously used, and the other raised security concerns about, open source: 
i partnered up with my buddy who owns a booter and ended up living 10 
minutes away from me. We both had our own stressers at the time and ended 
up meeting up one day. I was using open source until i started working with 
him. 
We coded our own source code from scratch with a limited number of 
developers... this helps avoid security flaws that are common with open source 
projects. 
The remaining participant advised that he had paid US$40 for someone to write the 
code for him: 
 28 
Some kid from the UK coded me a source for $40, although it was a pretty 
sloppy job and mainly re themed vDos / ragebooter it got the job done, all you 
really need is a nice-looking theme and kids will be buying like mad. 
Nine participants responded to the question about how the service was set up, with six 
advising that they had done the coding themselves. Another advised that the code was 
written predominantly by a friend of his: 
i actually got pretty lucky and met one of the biggest booter owns and became 
good friends with him and didn't have to write much of my own.  
One participant paid someone to build the customer-facing websites and to automate 
the provisioning of the DDoS attacks themselves (using scripting languages to invoke 
commands): 
At first, we used API on rent. After learning all stuff how it's operated, we 
made our own setup. We paid someone to setup our servers and scripts. 
Another had ‘in house engineers’ who wrote the code for the services: 
Our service runs off of dedicated servers running our custom coded scripts... 
they are all setup with our in house engineers 
Ten participants responded to the question about where they advertised these services. 
Two participants mentioned online forums, and a further three specifically mentioned 
the website hackforums.net. Two participants advised that they received enough 
business through word of mouth. Two participants advertised on YouTube, and one 
also on Twitter. One participant used affiliate marketing. Two participants advised 
that they did not advertise at all, with one stating that: 
We do not advertise at this time, we believe that if someone is looking for our 
service, they will find it 
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Ten participants answered the question about how the majority of visitors landed on 
their site. The most common response option selected was search engines (n = 4). 
Two participants selected ‘visiting the URL directly’, while a further two did not 
know. Two selected ‘other’, with one stating: 
How the fuck did you get to it? I don't even advertise it anywhere and have no 
idea how you even found it 
Three participants ran the site on their own, with no others, four ran the site with one 
other person, and three with two or more other people. Three participants declined to 
answer this question.  
Participants were asked to estimate the percentage breakdown of tests 
performed against game servers, TeamSpeak servers, individual Internet users or 
organisations, and other targets. The response options were limited so that the total 
had to equal 100. Six participants responded to this question. On average, it was 
estimated that most of the services targeted individual Internet users or organisations 
(M = 40.17, SD = 36.79, range = 1-95). This was closely followed by game servers, 
which received, on average, an estimated 37.0 percent of stress tests (SD = 35.27, 
range = 5-97). Targets categorised as ‘other’ received an average of 23.5 percent of 
stress tests (SD = 38.18, range = 0-100), followed by TeamSpeak servers, which on 
average received 16.0 percent of stress tests (SD = 19.95, range 0-50).  
Discussion and conclusion 
Many cybercrimes are not unique, in that they reflect crimes that previously took 
place in physical space. However, it is the environment, or the “bottle”, to borrow 
Grabosky’s (2001) analogy, in which offenders operate that makes these types of 
offences distinctive. For example, an individual cannot necessarily engage in 
offending that requires a high level of technical knowledge without first obtaining that 
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requisite knowledge. The provision of booter services is one such example of a niche, 
high tech, crime type. However, it is not just the technical knowledge that is required, 
but information about the market for DDoS attacks, and how to monetise this.  
With an interest in computers, technology or gaming, would-be-offenders 
begin by communicating online, during which they learn the techniques to commit 
cybercrime as well as share the definitions favourable towards offending and 
techniques of neutralisation. It is through associating with others, and communicating 
on online communities, that offenders learn about booter services. All of the booter 
service providers are young and male. Age and gender corresponds with the 
demographics found on the online communities where differential association takes 
place.  
Offending is gradual, from using booter services, to providing services 
themselves, and sometimes escalating to other types of online offending behaviour. 
Offenders also indicate that they have internalised the techniques of neutralisation. 
Participants neutralise their actions by appealing to higher loyalties, claiming that 
they are providing an important service for network testing. The most commonly used 
technique is denial of responsibility. While this was the least used neutralisation 
technique found in Turgeman-Goldschmidt’s (2009) or Hutchings’ (2013b) earlier 
research, it reflects the type of behaviour that the offender is engaged in.  
We found a comparable number of booter services as those found by Santanna 
and Sperotto (2014), supporting our claim that our survey captured the entire known 
population of offenders offering booter services. The income and operational model 
that we found was consistent with Karami and McCoy’s description (2013a). The 
most commonly reported way to advertise booter services is through the online 
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communities where skills are learnt and definitions favourable towards offending are 
shared.  
The provision of booter services is maintained by the ‘easy money’, with little 
cost in terms of time spent maintaining the sites. While the estimated income arising 
from this study is lower than that found by Karami and McCoy (2013a), we took a 
conservative approach in our calculations. Also, the one booter service that informed 
Karami and McCoy (2013a) research may not be typical of booter services in general, 
as it had been targeted and the data subsequently leaked. The most frustration that is 
faced by participants is in relation to receiving this easy money, as PayPal frequently 
disrupts the receipt of their payments. On the other hand, one company that claims to 
prevent denial of service attacks actually helps facilitate them, with many of the sites 
using CloudFlare to protect themselves against denial of service attacks, presumably 
by competitors. Participants do not indicate at all that they are concerned about law 
enforcement taking action against them, with many believing that their actions are not 
criminal. Participants try to minimise the harm of their activities, such as claiming 
that they offer the services for stress testing. However, it is clear from the other 
responses provided that their services are primarily used for attacks against systems 
not owned by the users, and the services are not advertised for network testing. 
We wanted to understand how best to run surveys for future work with similar 
offenders and we found that the option to participate in an online survey attracted a 
much higher response rate. However, the interviews resulted in more complete data, 
and allowed the interviewer to explore particular areas in more depth. It is believed 
that the survey may have been more convenient for participants, as it could be 
completed immediately, rather than making a time to participate in an interview. Our 
response rate was 25%, although since some respondents were running multiple 
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systems it may have been even more than this. It was much higher than we had 
anticipated, which we attribute to the nature of the behaviour being researched and the 
limited amount of law enforcement activity against booter service provision.  
This work has attempted to overcome some of the significant challenges found 
in this area of research. However, a number of limitations remain. First, despite 
attempting to contact the entire known population of active booter services, the small 
sample size makes it difficult to explore relationships within the data. Also, despite 
the high response rate (for an active offender population), there may be a self-
selection bias, in that those that chose to participate may differ from those that 
declined.  
There are also concerns that some respondents participated in the research so 
as to use it as a platform for excusing their behaviours. Therefore, the neutralisations 
that are presented may instead be defences against their actions. Another limitation is 
in determining the time-order sequence. This limitation applies to many prior studies 
examining the theorised causal explanations of crime. It is acknowledged that the best 
way to test the causal ordering is a longitudinal design; however this was not feasible 
for the current study.  
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Table 1: Beliefs About Whether Tests Against Different Targets Should be Illegal 
Should the following be against the law? Yes  No 
Provision of stresser services in general (n = 10) 1 (10.0%) 9 (90.0%) 
Stresser tests against game servers (n = 8) 3 (37.5%) 5 (62.5%) 
Stresser tests against TeamSpeak servers (n = 8) 4 (50.0%) 4 (50.0%) 
Stresser tests against individual Internet users or 
organisations (n = 8) 
4 (50.0%) 4 (50.0%) 
 
Table 2: Beliefs About Whether Tests Against Different Targets are Illegal 
Are the following against the law in your 
location? 
Yes No Don’t 
know 
Provision of stresser services in general (n = 9) 1 (11.1%) 5 (55.6%) 3 (33.3%) 
Stresser tests against game servers (n = 8) 2 (25.0%) 3 (37.5%) 3 (37.5%) 
Stresser tests against TeamSpeak servers (n = 
8) 
2 (25.0%) 3 (37.5%) 3 (37.5%) 
Stresser tests against individual Internet users 
or organisations (n = 8) 
2 (25.0%) 3 (37.5%) 3 (37.5%) 
  
Table 3: Appropriateness of Tests Against Different Targets 
How appropriate are the following, on a scale of one 
(totally inappropriate) to ten (totally appropriate)? 
M SD Range 
Provision of stresser services to anyone who wished to buy 
them (n = 8) 
7.75 3.66 1-10 
Stresser tests against game servers (n = 8) 4.88 3.52 1-10 
Stresser tests against TeamSpeak servers (n = 8) 4.00 3.51 1-10 
Stresser tests against individual Internet users or 
organisations (n = 8) 
4.88 4.45 1-10 
 
Table 4: Stresser Tests in an Average Month 
For an average month M SD Range 
Number of stresser tests performed (n = 
8) 
171,713.63 269,581.41 200-754,768 
Number of cumulative hours stresser 
tests are performed for (n = 7) 
1,590.20 2,915.77 0.8-7,790 
Number of individual accounts 
requesting stresser tests (n = 7) 
5,018.57 10,526.00 20-28,847 
Number of tests per account (n = 7) 90.56 173.91 10-483 
Number of seconds per test (n = 7) 229.64 406.38 0-1,000 
 
 
 
